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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to detect users generating spam reviews
or review spammers. We identify several characteristic be-
haviors of review spammers and model these behaviors so
as to detect the spammers. In particular, we seek to model
the following behaviors. First, spammers may target specific
products or product groups in order to maximize their im-
pact. Second, they tend to deviate from the other reviewers
in their ratings of products. We propose scoring methods
to measure the degree of spam for each reviewer and apply
them on an Amazon review dataset. We then select a sub-
set of highly suspicious reviewers for further scrutiny by our
user evaluators with the help of a web based spammer eval-
uation software specially developed for user evaluation ex-
periments. Our results show that our proposed ranking and
supervised methods are effective in discovering spammers
and outperform other baseline method based on helpfulness
votes alone. We finally show that the detected spammers
have more significant impact on ratings compared with the
unhelpful reviewers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Data Mining
General Terms
Algorithms, Measurement, Experimentation
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Web spam refers to all forms of malicious manipulation of
user generated data so as to influence usage patterns of the
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Product o1
The worst CD Player I had purchased so far.
I bought this CD player thinking that it looks nice and well designed. But, I
regretted soon after it does not produce great CD quality sound. I now hate it
and would like to replace it asap.
8VHU³0U8QKDSS\´
(a)
Product o2
The worst CD Player I had purchased so far.
I bought this CD player thinking that it looks nice and well designed. But, I
regretted soon after it does not produce great CD quality sound. I now hate
it and would like to replace it asap.
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Figure 1: Review Spam Examples
data. Examples of web spam include search engine spam
[1], email spam [3], and video spam [2]. In this paper, we fo-
cus on spam found in online product review sites commonly
known as review spam or opinion spam [9, 10]. Review
spam is designed to give unfair view of some products so
as to influence the consumers’ perception of the products
by directly or indirectly inflating or damaging the product’s
reputation. In [6], it was found that 10 to 15% of reviews
essentially echo the earlier reviews and may potentially be
influenced by review spam.
Consider Figure 1a which illustrates a review for product
o1 by user “Mr Unhappy”. The review is highly negative
with 1-star rating in contrast with the high overall 4.5 star
rating. This review does not cause any alarm until we find
another highly negative review by the same user on a dif-
ferent product o2 and both reviews are identical in content
(see Figure 1b). Since identical review content for different
products reflects a strong bias or a lack of seriousness, and
the user’s ratings are very different from the rest, we con-
sider the two reviews likely to be spam and the user likely to
be a spammer. Products o1 and o2 have 16 and 80 reviews
respectively.
It is not clear how much review spam exists in online prod-
uct review sites but their existence causes several problems
including unfair treatment of products either independently
or in comparison with other similar products. Both under-
rating (or “bad mouthing”) and over-rating (or “ballot stuff-
ing”) affect the sales performance of the affected products
especially for review sites that also offer buying and selling
of products. When consumers rely on reviews from spam-
mers to purchase products, they could be disappointed by
purchased products not meeting their expectation, or mis-
judging good products. It is thus an important task to detect
review spam and remove them so as to protect the genuine
interests of consumers and product vendors.
Detecting review spam is a challenging task as no one
knows exactly the amount of spam in existence. Due to
the openness of product review sites, spammers can pose
as different users (known as “sockpuppeting”) contributing
spammed reviews making them harder to eradicate com-
pletely. Spam reviews usually look perfectly normal until
one compares them with other reviews of the same products
to identify review comments not consistent with the latter.
The efforts of additional comparisons by the users make the
detection task tedious and non-trivial. One approach taken
by review site such as Amazon.com is to allow users to label
or vote the reviews as helpful or not. Unfortunately, this still
demands user efforts and is subject to abuse by spammers.
The state-of-the-art approach to review spam detection is
to treat the reviews as the target of detection [10]. This ap-
proach represents a review by review-, reviewer- and product-
level features, and trains a classifier to distinguish spam re-
views from non-spam ones. However, these features may not
provide direct evidence against the spammed review. For the
example in Figure 1, we rely on (a) comparison with other
ratings on the same products by the contributor, and (b)
identical review content for different products by the con-
tributor. Both are behaviors of reviewer that deviate from
normal practice and are highly suspicious of review manip-
ulation. This suggests that one should focus on detecting
spammers based on their spamming behaviors, instead of
detecting spam reviews. In fact, the more spamming behav-
iors we can detect for a reviewer, the more likely the reviewer
is a spammer. Subsequently, the reviews of this reviewer can
be removed to protect the interests of other review users.
1.2 Review Spammer Detection
In this paper, we address the problem of review spam-
mer detection, or finding users who are the source of spam
reviews. Unlike the approaches for spammed review detec-
tion, our proposed review spammer detection approach is
user centric, and user behavior driven. A user centric ap-
proach is preferred over the review centric approach as gath-
ering behavioral evidence of spammers is easier than that of
spam reviews. A review involves only one reviewer and one
product. The amount of evidence is limited. A reviewer on
the other hand may have reviewed a number of products and
hence has contributed a number of reviews. The likelihood
of finding evidence against spammers will be much higher.
The user centric approach is also scalable as one can always
incorporate new spamming behaviors as they emerge.
The main building blocks of the spamming behavior de-
tection step are the spamming behavior models based
on different review patterns that suggest spamming. Each
model assigns a numeric spamming behavior score to each
reviewer by measuring the extent to which the reviewer prac-
tises spamming behavior of a certain type. In this paper,
we mainly rely on patterns of review content and ratings
to define four different spamming behavior models, i.e., (a)
targeting product (TP); (b) targeting group (TG); (c) gen-
eral rating deviation (GD); and (b) early rating deviation
(ED). To assign an overall numeric spam score to each user,
we combine the spam scores of the user’s different spamming
behaviors using linear weighted combination. The weights
on the different component spam scores can be empirically
defined or learnt automatically.
Our proposed behavior models shy away from deep natu-
ral review text understanding and opinion extraction mainly
to avoid high computational costs and performance pitfalls
due to inaccurate text analysis. Should text analysis be
accurate enough to extract opinions from review text, our
spamming behavior models can be extended to consider re-
view content. Nevertheless, content analysis can be com-
putationally costly and we shall leave this to our future re-
search.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 covers the relevant related work. Section 3 describes
the data representation and dataset used in this research.
Our proposed characterizations of target-based and deviation-
based spamming behaviors are given in Sections 4 and 5
respectively. Section 6 describes an user evaluation experi-
ment of our proposed unsupervised spammer scoring meth-
ods. The supervised version of the spammer scoring method
is given in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey the related research in review
spammer detection and compare them with that presented
in this paper.
Review Opinion and Sentiment Mining. In the con-
text of opinion mining, there are several efforts in extracting
and aggregating positive and negative opinions from prod-
uct reviews [7, 16]. These works focus mainly on text min-
ing and extraction aspect of review content. While these
extracted opinions can be useful in identifying bias opinions
in reviews, they do not address spam detection unless being
used to derive other more relevant features for the task.
Review Spam Detection. Review spam detection is
a relatively new research problem which has not yet been
well studied. A preliminary study was reported in [9]. A
more in-depth investigation was given in [10]. In this work,
three types of review spam were identified, namely untruth-
ful reviews (reviews that promote or defame products), re-
views on brands but not products, and non-reviews (e.g.,
advertisements). By representing a review using a set of
review-, reviewer- and product-level features, classification
techniques are used to assign spam labels to reviews. In
particular, untruthful review detection is performed by us-
ing duplicate reviews as labeled data.
Reviews usually come with ratings. Detecting unfair or
fraudulent ratings has been studied in several works includ-
ing [5, 17]. The techniques used include: (a) clustering rat-
ings into unfairly high ratings and unfairly low ratings, and
(b) using third party ratings on the producers of ratings and
ratings from less reputable producers are then deemed as un-
fair. Once unfair ratings are found, they can be removed to
restore a fair item evaluation system. These works did not
address review spammer detection directly. They usually
did not conduct evaluation of their techniques on real data.
Review helpfulness prediction is closely related to review
spam detection. The former aims to differentiate reviews of
different helpfulness. A helpful review is one that is infor-
mative and useful to the readers. The purpose of predicting
review helpfulness is to help review sites to give feedbacks to
the review contributors and to help readers choose and read
high quality reviews. A classification approach to solving
helpfulness prediction using review content and meta-data
features was developed in [12]. The meta-data features used
are review’s rating and the difference between the review
rating and the average rating of all reviews of the product.
Liu et. al proposes to derive from reviews content features
that correspond to informativeness, readability and subjec-
tiveness aspects of review [15]. These features are then used
to train a helpfulness classification method.
Item Spam Detection. Wu and others attempted to
identify items that are targets of spamming by identifying
singleton reviews on the reviewed items[17]. Singleton re-
views are the reviews written by users who contribute only
one review each. These users subsequently contribute no
other reviews. Proportion of positive singleton reviews, con-
centration of positive singleton reviews, and rating distor-
tion caused by singleton reviews are thus used to analyse
possibly spammed hotels in TripAdvisor.
Comparison with Review Spam and Item Spam
Detections. Instead of detecting review and item spams,
this paper focuses on detecting reviewers who are spammers.
The three problems are intimately related as solving one may
help to solve the other two. For example, knowing which re-
views are spam can provide pointers to review spammers
and spammed items. Given that there are no perfect solu-
tions for the three problems, it is still necessary to conduct
research on each of the problems. This paper also takes a
unique approach to detect review spammers by examining
their rating behaviors and deriving features that can be used
in review spammer detection methods.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the
first attempt to solve the review spammer detection prob-
lem. It uses rating behavior features to detect review spam-
mers. The proposed method can further help to find review
and item spam, or be extended to use the results of review
and item spam detection to improve its accuracy. In our
companion paper [11], rule mining is used to help find atyp-
ical review patterns, which may indicate spam activities.
Helpful Review Prediction. Amazon.com allows users
to vote a review to be helpful or not. This helpfulness votes
are manually assigned and are thus subjective and possibly
abused. Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et. al found that a strong
correlation between proportion of helpful votes of reviews
and the deviation of the review ratings from the average
ratings of products [4]. This correlation illustrates that help-
ful votes are generally consistent with average ratings. The
study is however conducted at the collection level and does
not provide evidence to link between spam and helpfulness
votes.
Detecting spam and predicting helpfulness are two sepa-
rate problems since not all unhelpful reviews are spam. A
poorly written review can be unhelpful but is not a spam.
Spam reviews usually target specific products while unhelp-
ful votes may be given to any products. Given the motive
driven nature of spamming activities, review spam detection
will therefore require an approach different from unhelpful
review detection.
Outlier Detection. Finding review spammers is also re-
lated to outlier detection [13]. The spammers are ‘outliers’
in the sense of behaving differently from other reviewers who
are non-spammers. Prior literature mostly attempts to de-
fine outliers by some notion of distance. However, spamming
behaviors are complex and not easily captured by distance.
For instance, the target-based spamming behavior described
in Section 4 may in fact involve very similar or duplicate
reviews. While the deviation-based behaviors described in
Section 5 are in some sense distance-based, it has to in-
corporate spamming-specific factors such as how early the
deviation occurs.
3. REVIEW DATASET
Amazon Dataset. In this research, we assume the prod-
uct review data follows the database schema used by Ama-
zon.com. Each product has a profile page that links to a
set of reviews contributed by different users. Each product
may also have a brand and zero or more product attributes
assigned. These attributes may vary depending on the prod-
uct type. Taking book product as an example, the relevant
attributes include author, publisher, publication year, and
price.
Each user can contribute one or multiple reviews to a
product. Contributing multiple reviews by the same user
is counter-intuitive but is allowed for updating previous re-
views and to perhaps add new comments on the reviewed
products. Each review consists of both a textual comment
and a numeric rating score which takes a value between 1
to 5. For simplicity, we assume that every rating score is
normalized to the [0,1] range. As a user reads a review, she
can optionally cast a binary vote (helpful or not-helpful) to
the review. The helpfulness voters’ identities are assumed
to be non-available.
For evaluation purposes, we use a Amazon’s dataset down-
loaded using APIs. This dataset, known as Manufactured
Products (MProducts), has product attributes including: (a)
ProductID; (b) Sales Rank; (c) Brand; (d) Sales Price; and
(e) Product Categories.
Pre-processing. Several data preprocessing steps are
performed on the above dataset before it is used.
• Removal of anonymous users: We first remove anony-
mous users and their reviews. Each anonymous user
id may be used by multiple persons.
• Removal of duplicate products: We also identify sets
of duplicate products in the dataset and remove them
except for one representative product per set. This
step is necessary since Amazon.com maintains dupli-
cate products (essentially the same product with some
very minor variations, e.g. color) and replicates re-
views across them. In other words, given a set of du-
plicate products, a review written on a product will be
replicated and added to other products in this set. Us-
ing the identical reviews, we detect sets of such prod-
ucts and randomly choose one representative product
from each set to keep while removing others.
• Removal of inactive users and unpopular products : To
focus on users who are active and products that at-
tract some user attention, our dataset includes only
users with no fewer than 3 reviews and products with
no fewer than 3 reviews. This is done by repetitively
applying minimum number of reviews threshold on
Table 1: Dataset Statistics
Number (before preprocessing)
U: set of users 11,038 (313,120)
O: set of objects 5,693 (32,075)
V: set of reviews 48,894 (404,637)
E: set of ratings as above
users and products in alternate order until all users
and products meet the threshold.
• Resolution of brand name synonyms : We found out
that the products’ brand names suffer from the syn-
onymy problem which involves multiple brand names
assigned to the same brands. E.g., the brand“HP”may
also be called “Hewlett Packard” or “HP Technology”.
Brand synonyms prevent us from grouping products by
their brands. Fortunately, there are only few hundreds
of brand names in MProducts. We therefore were able
to resolve synonyms by manual inspection and replace
them by the representative brand names.
Finally, we arrive at the preprocessed dataset with statis-
tics shown in Table 11. Another larger Amazon dataset on
book items has also been downloaded and preprocessed in
the similar manner. While our observations for the Book
dataset generally are applicable to those of Manufactured
Products dataset, this paper does not include the discussion
here to conserve space.
Notations. In the following, we list the notations to be
used in the subsequent sections.
• U = {ui}: set of users
• O = {oj}: set of objects2. Let B = {bk} denote the set
of brands and b(oj) ∈ B denote the brand of object oj .
• V = {vk}: set of reviews vk’s. The review vk comes with
a rating ek.
• E = {ek}: set of ratings ek’s (ek ∈ [0, 1]).
• u(vk) = u(ek): user of review vk and rating ek.
• o(vk) = o(ek): object of review vk and rating ek.
• r(vk) = r(ek): order position (∈ {1, · · · }) of review vk
and rating ek with respect to the reviewed object.
• Vij = {vk|u(vk) = ui ∧ o(vk) = oj}: set of reviews from
user ui to object oj .
• Eij = {ek|u(ek) = ui ∧ o(ek) = oj}: set of ratings from
user ui to object oj .
• Ei∗ = ∪jEij : set of all ratings by user ui
• E∗j = ∪iEij : set of all ratings on object oj
4. TARGET-BASED SPAMMING
To game the online review systems, we hypothesize that
a spammer will direct most of his efforts to promote or vic-
timize a few products or product lines which are collectively
known as the targeted products or targeted product groups.
He is expected to monitor targeted products and product
groups closely and mitigate the ratings when time is appro-
priate. We thus define three spamming behaviors involving
1Numbers in the parentheses are the raw counts before ap-
plying filter.
2In this paper, object and product are used interchangeably.
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Figure 2: Single Product Multiple Reviews/Ratings
in MProducts
targeted products and product groups and derive their re-
spective spam scores for each reviewer representing the ex-
tent to which he practises the behaviors.
4.1 Targeting Products
Spamming against a specific targeted product is an act
that can be most easily observed by the number of reviews
(also ratings) on the product. In the MProducts dataset,
there are several reviewers who contribute multiple reviews
to the same products, i.e., |Eij | ≥ 2 (or |Vij | ≥ 2), as shown
in Figure 2. For each |Eij | = x value, the figure shows the
number of reviewer-product pairs (in log10 scale) having x
(x > 1) reviews. The figure also shows the distribution of
pairs with all 5 ratings and pairs with all 1 or 2 ratings.
In MProducts, 2874 reviewer-product pairs involve multi-
ple reviews/ratings. This number is considered very small
given the much larger numbers of reviewers and products.
Most of these pairs, 1220 of them, involve only ratings of 5
compared with 624 of them involving only ratings of 1 or
2. This observation is consistent with the many high rat-
ings in the dataset. Interestingly, several pairs involve both
high and low ratings (2874 − 1220 − 624 = 1030 of them)
suggesting that the corresponding reviewers changed their
ratings on the same products, which may be caused by dif-
ferent reasons. For example, a reviewer may revise rating on
a product after finding out the correct way to use it. Note
that there are also very few pairs involving 3 to as many as
10 ratings.
4.1.1 Rating Spamming
Reviewers who are involved in reviewer-product pairs with
larger number of ratings are likely to be spammers, espe-
cially when the ratings are not very different from one an-
other. We thus define the following user spam score function
cp,e(ui) for user ui based on rating spamming behavior on
some targeted products:
cp,e(ui) =
si
Maxu′i∈Usi′
(1)
where si represents the unnormalized spammer score of ui
defined by:
si =
∑
eij∈Eij ,|Eij |>1
|Eij | · sim(Eij) (2)
The denominator of (1) returns the maximum si among all
users. The function sim() is a similarity function comparing
ratings in a given set and is defined as:
sim(Eij) = 1− Avg
ek,ek′∈Eij ,k<k′
|ek − ek′ | (3)
Based on the above spam score function, reviewers with
large proportions of ratings involved as multiple similar rat-
ings on products are to be assigned high spam scores.
4.1.2 Review Text Spamming
As a user spams a product with multiple ratings, he is
also likely to spam the product with multiple review texts.
Such review texts are likely to be identical or look similar
so as to conserve spamming efforts. On the other hand,
there are also users who contribute multiple reviews to the
same products for genuine reasons. For example, some may
divide their reviews into smaller reviews. Some make minor
changes to their reviews to improve clarity. Hence, it is
necessary to distinguish such genuine cases from the more
dubious ones. We define the similarity between two reviews
vk and vk′ , sim(vk, vk′), by:
sim(vk, vk′) = cosine(vk, vk′) (4)
where each review text is represented by a bag of bi-grams
and cosine(vk, vk′) is the cosine similarity of the bi-gram
TFIDF vectors of vk and vk′ . When sim(vk, vk′) = 1, we
consider the two reviews identical. TFIDF refers to the fre-
quency × inverse document frequency of a bi-gram. By con-
sidering IDF, the dominance of popular bi-grams will be re-
duced. Given a set of reviews Vij (|Vij | > 1), we derive a
similarity score sim(Vij) as follows:
sim(Vij) = Avg
vk,vk′∈Vij ,k<k′
sim(vk, vk′) (5)
Then, we define the user spam score function cp,v(ui) for
user ui based on review spamming behavior on some targeted
products:
cp,v(ui) =
s′i
Maxu′i∈Us
′
i′
(6)
where
s′i =
∑
vij∈Vij ,|Vij|>1
|Vij | · sim(Vij) (7)
4.1.3 Combined Spam Score
We combine the above two spam scores due to single prod-
uct multiple reviews by taking the average:
cp(ui) =
1
2
(cp,e(ui) + cp,v(ui)) (8)
4.2 Targeting Product Groups
The above two spam models assign spam scores to each
user based on their multiple ratings and review texts on the
same products. In this section, we introduce a spam behav-
ior model (also known as single product group multi-
ple ratings) defined on the pattern of spammers manip-
ulating ratings of a set of products sharing some common
attribute(s) within a short span of time. For example, a
spammer may target several products of same brand within
a few hours. This pattern of ratings saves the spammers’
time as they do not need to log on to the product review
system many times. To achieve maximum impact, the rat-
ings given to these target group of products are either very
high or low. We can thus further define two types of single
product group multiple ratings behavior, one for very high
ratings and another for very low ones. The users who con-
tribute ratings on the targeted product groups are likely to
be spam.
4.2.1 Single Product Group Multiple High Ratings
To model rating behavior that involves very high ratings
on products sharing the same attribute by the same user
within a short span of time, we divide the whole time pe-
riod into small disjoint time windows of fixed-size and de-
rive clusters of very high ratings. Such rating clusters are
suspicious of promoting a product group. The high rating
cluster by user ui to a product group bk (identified by some
product attribute) in time window w is defined as follows:
EHik(w) = {eij ∈ Ei∗ | oj ∈ bk∧t(eij) ∈ w∧eij ∈ HRatingSet}
(9)
where HRatingSet is a set of ratings that are considered
very high. At Amazon.com site, a raw rating score of 5
(or a normalized rating score of 1) is considered very high.
Hence, we use HRatingSet = {1} by default.
We assume that only sufficiently large EHik’s can possibly
be due to spams and impose a minimum size threshold of
minsizeH. Only clusters with size larger than minsizeH
will thus be retained in CHi ’s (defined below) for further
spam scoring. The time window w should be chosen to be
sufficiently large enough for multiple ratings to be given by
the same user but small enough to capture the burstiness of
ratings. In our experiments, we have empirically set w to
be a day interval and minsizeH = 3 which give reasonably
good results (see Section 6). The product attribute used
for MProducts and Books datasets are brand and publisher
respectively.
CHi = ∪k,w{EHik(w)| |EHik(w)| ≥ minsizeH} (10)
The spam score a user ui based on single product group
multiple high ratings behavior is thus defined by:
cg,H(ui) =
CHi
Maxu′i∈UC
H
i′
(11)
4.2.2 Single Product Group Multiple Low Ratings
Instead of single product group multiple high ratings, spam-
mers may adopt the opposite behavior, i.e., assigning several
low ratings (usually the raw rating score of 1 or 2 out of 5) to
demote a group of products. The motive here is to create a
negative perception of the affected products so as to reduce
their sales. We define a low rating cluster by user ui to a
product group bk sharing some attribute a in time window
w as follow:
ELik(w) = {eij ∈ Ei∗ | oj ∈ bk∧t(eij) ∈ w∧eij ∈ LRatingSet}
(12)
We use LRatingSet = {0, 0.25} corresponding to the raw
rating scores of 1 and 2. The set of low rating clusters by
user ui that meet the minimum size threshold minsize
L is
captured by:
CLi = ∪k,w{ELik(w)| |ELik(w)| ≥ minsizeL} (13)
We empirically set w to be a day interval and minsizeL =
2 in our experiments. A smaller minsizeL compared to
minsizeH is chosen as small low rating clusters look more
suspicious than small high rating clusters due to an overall
much smaller proportion of low ratings in the entire dataset.
We then define the spam score of a user ui based on single
product group multiple low ratings as:
cg,L(ui) =
CLi
Maxu′i∈UC
L
i′
(14)
4.2.3 Combined Spam Score
We again combine the above two spam scores due to single
product group multiple ratings by simply taking the average:
cg(ui) =
1
2
(cg,H(ui) + cg,L(ui)) (15)
5. DEVIATION-BASED SPAMMING
5.1 General Deviation
A reasonable rater is expected to give ratings similar to
other raters of the same product. As spammers attempt to
promote or demote products, their ratings could be quite
different from other raters. General deviation is therefore a
possible rating behavior demonstrated by a spammer. We
define the deviation of a rating eij as its difference from the
average rating on the same product:
dij = eij − Avg
e∈E∗j
e (16)
The spam score of a user ui based on general deviation is
thus defined as the average deviation of his or her ratings:
cd(ui) = Avg
eij∈Ei∗
|dij | (17)
5.2 Early Deviation
Early deviation captures the behavior of a spammer con-
tributing a review spam soon after product is made available
for review. Such spams are likely to attract attention from
other reviewers allowing spammers to manipulate the views
of subsequent reviewers. It will take the victimized products
several good ratings from other genuine reviewers to recover
from these early low ratings.
The early deviation model thus relies on two pieces of
information for assigning an early deviation behavior score:
(a) deviation of each rating from the mean rating of the
rated product, and (b) weight of each rating indicating how
early the rating was given. The deviation of a rating of a
user ui on an object oj is defined as the difference between
eij from the mean of ratings on object oj :
dij = eij − Avg
e∈E∗j
e (18)
The weight of each rating eij is denoted by wij and is
defined as follows:
wij =
1
(rij)α
(19)
where rij refers to the rank order of eij among ratings as-
signed to the rated product. We set rij = i for the ith rating
(or review) of a product. α is a parameter greater than 1 to
accelerate the rate of decay for wij .
Thus, the spam score of a user ui is defined as:
ce(ui) =
∑
eij∈Ei∗(|dij | × wij)∑
eij∈Ei∗ wij
(20)
6. USER EVALUATION
6.1 Objectives
To evaluate the performance of different solution meth-
ods, we need some ground truth labels of users. Given that
such labels do not exist in the public, we thus decide to
conduct user evaluation on different methods derived from
the spamming behaviors proposed in this paper. We want
to know which methods are able to detect review spammers
more accurately. Should any method fails to detect spam-
mers correctly, we want to know how the method is led to
the wrong conclusion. We also hope to elicit other spamming
behaviors we may have missed out.
The spammer detection methods to be evaluated are based
on: (a) single product multiple reviews behavior (TP) only;
(b) single product group multiple reviews behavior (TG)
only; (c) general deviation (GD) behavior; and (d) early de-
viation (ED) behavior with α=1.5. Each method works by
ranking the users by decreasing behavior score (i.e., cp(ui),
cge(u+ i), cd(ui), and ce(ui)) order. The highly ranked users
are more likely to be spammers. We also introduce a new
combined method (ALL) that considers all the behaviors
using a combined behavior score c(ui) as follows:
c(ui) =
1
2
cp(ui) +
1
4
cg(ui) +
1
8
cd(ui) +
1
8
ce(ui) (21)
The weighting scheme is empirically determined to give more
emphasis to product specific spamming than group specific
spamming. Deviations are generally weaker evidences and
thus given the smallest weightage.
Baseline. We finally introduce a baseline method which
ranks the reviewers by their unhelpfulness. Each review is
assigned helpfulness votes of 1 (unhelpful) and 0 (helpful)
by other users. We then derive the unhelpfulness score of
a reviewer by averaging the helpfulness vote values received
for his reviews. A unhelpfulness score of 1 thus implies that
the reviewer receives only unhelpful votes. On the other
hand, reviewers with unhelpfulness score of 0 receive helpful
votes only.
6.2 Evaluation Methodology
There are several challenges in conducting the user eval-
uation experiments. Firstly, there are many reviewers and
it is impossible for our human evaluators to judge everyone
(see Table 1). Secondly, evaluating a reviewer alone can al-
ready be very time consuming especially when the reviewer
has contributed many reviews. The number of reviews per
user can be as large as 349 (235 after pre-processing) for
our MProducts dataset. It will take human evaluators too
much time to use the existing web interface of Amazon.com,
which was not designed for spammer evaluation, to exam-
ine these reviews and the reviewed products. The existing
Amazon’s web interface is only good for users who want
to search and contribute product reviews. Finally, to dis-
courage sloppiness in user evaluation, we need to train our
human evaluators and track their work ensuring that they
provide high quality evaluation. This will subsequently give
us trustworthy evaluation outcome that can be subsequently
analysed and extracted to derive the ground truth labels.
We handle the first issue by choosing a relatively small
subset of reviewers to be evaluated. These comprise both
reviewers highly suspicious of spamming by each methods
as well as those un-suspicious ones. Human evaluation of
a small sample is not new as it has been widely used in
information retrieval (IR) task evaluation, e.g., evaluating
the relevance of search results for only a small sample of
search queries instead of all queries. Similar to IR evalua-
tion which examines the top ranked results of search engines,
we address the second issue by selecting a subset of reviews
of each selected reviewer for the human evaluators to ex-
amine while still providing access to other non-highlighted
reviews [8]. The purpose here is to identify some suspicious
reviews, i.e., those contributing to spamming behaviors, as
the highlighted subset that should be interesting for human
evaluators to begin their evaluation. Should other reviews
become relevant to the evaluation, the evaluators should still
be able to view and compare them with other reviews.
Review Spammer Evaluation Software
In addition to selecting small numbers of reviewers and re-
views, we also develop a review spammer evaluation software
that ensures that the human evaluators can easily browse
the reviewer profiles and their reviews (both selected and
non-selected). The software is configured to mandate the
human evaluators to examine all selected reviews (10 per
reviewer in our experiments) before making their judgement
on the associated reviewer. The human evaluators are also
expected to enter textual comments and reasons during their
evaluation. This reduces the chance of frivolous evaluation
thus addressing the third issue in the evaluation process.
Furthermore, the software provides easy visualization of re-
views with exact and near-duplicates, review ratings among
recent ratings on the same products, multiple reviews on
same products, and multiple reviews on the same product
groups (not necessary on the same day). These features also
help to reduce the amount of evaluation efforts and time.
Figure 3 depicts the user interface of the software when
a selected reviewer is examined. The reviewer has 19 re-
views written for 17 products implying that he has multiple
reviews for the two products (as shown in the right lower
panel). The left lower panel shows the 10 selected reviews
by the reviewer with the 1st review highlighted for display
in the center upper panel. The center lower panel shows
two products each with two reviews by the reviewer and one
of the products has two near-duplicate reviews annotated
with pink stars. The right upper panel shows the rating of
the highlighted review along with other ratings on the same
product concerned. The right lower panel shows the sev-
eral brands reviewed by the reviewer, and his duplicate and
near-duplicate reviews annotated with red and pink stars
respectively.
Experiment Setup
The evaluation setup consists of the following steps:
• For each spammer detection method, we select 10 top
ranked reviewers and 10 bottom ranked reviewers. We
then merge all the selected spammers into a pool which
consists of 62 reviewers. These reviewers are then
sorted by their combined spamming behavior scores.
25 top ranked reviewers and 25 bottom ranked review-
ers are then selected for user evaluation. This number
of reviewers is quite reasonable for a human evaluator
to examine. We further randomly order the review-
ers so that there is no relationship between reviewers’
order and their spammer scores.
• For each reviewer, select 10 of his/her reviews to be
highlighted for human evaluator’s attention. These se-
lected reviews must be seen by the human evaluator
before the latter makes judgement on whether the re-
viewer is a spammer. The reviews are selected based
on their involvement in the spamming behaviors iden-
tified. Specifically, we select:
– Reviews that are: (i) exact (or near-exact) du-
plicates of other reviews or (ii) have identical (or
similar) ratings with other reviews on the same
product by the evaluated reviewer (we call these
the TP reviews);
– Reviews of some products in product groups with
multiple identical high or low ratings from the
evaluated reviewer within the same day (TG re-
views);
– Reviews by the evaluated reviewer having ratings
deviated from the average ratings of the reviewed
products (GD reviews);
– Reviews by the evaluated reviewer having ratings
deviated from the average ratings of the reviewed
products and are the early reviews of the reviewed
products (ED reviews).
For reviewers with less than 10 reviews under the above
four categories, we randomly select other reviews to
cover the shortfall (random reviews).
• Three human evaluators are recruited to examine the
selected reviewers and their selected reviews using the
review spammer evaluation software. They are tertiary
students familiar with searching and reading product
reviews at Amazon website. The software records the
spammer label decisions of each evaluator and the re-
views actually viewed by the evaluator. For each re-
viewer, the labeled decision is either “spammer” and
“non-spammer” and the evaluators are not informed
about the number of spammers to be labeled. The
evaluators are also told to mark reviews “suspicious” if
they find the reviews likely to be used to spam prod-
ucts.
• Based on the labeled decisions, we determine theNor-
malized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG)
[8] performance of each method. The discounted cu-
mulative gain (DCG) of a ranked list of 50 reviewers
(ui1 , ui2 , · · · , ui50) is defined as:
DCG =
50∑
p=1
2f(ip) − 1
log2(1 + p)
(22)
where f(ip) equals to the number of votes uip received
(f(ip) ∈ [0, 3]). NDCG is simply DCG normalized
by the DCG of the ideal rank order of the items that
has spammers agreed by all 3 evaluators ranked before
those spammers agreed by 2 evaluators who are in turn
ranked before the remaining reviewers.
NDCG =
DCG
DCG of ideal ranked list
(23)
NDCG determines how well a method’s rank order
of reviewers follows the ideal rank order giving more
weightage (determined by log2(1 + p) in DCG) to the
Figure 3: Screenshot of Review Spammer Evaluation Software.
Table 2: Evaluation Results
Evaluator 1 Evaluator 2 Evaluator 3
# Spammers
Evaluator 1 26 18 20
Evaluator 2 - 23 18
Evaluator 3 - - 23
# Non-Spammers
Evaluator 1 24 19 21
Evaluator 2 - 27 22
Evaluator 3 - - 27
reviewers with higher importance (determined by f(ip)
in DCG).
6.3 Results
Inter-evaluator consistency. We first show the re-
sults of evaluation by our three evaluators. Table 2 shows
the number of spammers and non-spammers labeled by the
evaluators in the diagonal cells (with boldface font type),
and the number of overlapping spammers between each pair
of evaluators. As shown in the table, the evaluators are
largely consistent in their judgements of spammers and non-
spammers. All the three evaluators agrees on 16 spammers
and 18 non-spammers, constituting 78% of 50 evaluated re-
viewers. As the Cohen’s kappa values of our evaluator pairs
are between 0.48 and 0.64, we have moderate to substantial
inter-evaluator agreement3[14].
Spammer Ranking Performance. Given the results of
the three evaluators, we assign a final label to each reviewer
using majority voting. A reviewer is assigned a final label
if the label is agreed by two or more evaluators. We ended
up having 24 reviewers labeled as “spammers” (16 reviewers
have 3 votes each and 8 reviewers have 2 votes each) and 26
labeled as“non-spammers”(8 reviewers have 1 vote each and
18 reviewers have no vote). The number of top 10 reviewers
3The kappa κ values can be interpreted as: no agree-
ment (for κ < 0), slight agreement (for κ ∈ (0, 0.2]), fair
agreement (for κ ∈ (0.2, 0.4]), moderate agreement (for
κ ∈ (0.4, 0.6]), substantial agreement (for κ ∈ (0.6, 0.8]),
and almost perfect agreement (for κ ∈ (0.8, 1.0]).
Table 3: Results of Top 10 and Bottom 10 Ranked
Reviewers
Baseline TP TG GD ED ALL
# spammers 7 10 10 6 6 10
in top 10
# non-spammers 7 10 9 6 7 10
in bottom 10
with the final spammer labels, and the number of bottom 10
reviewers with non-spammer labels for different methods are
shown in Table 3. The results show that the ALL and TP
methods correctly rank the spammers and non-spammers
at the top and bottom ranks respectively. They are signif-
icantly better than the Baseline method based on helpful
votes. This is followed by TG. GD and ED are slightly
worse than Baseline.
Next, we examine the NDCG for different top k positions
(k= 1 to 50) in the rank list produced by each method. As
shown in Figure 4, ALL, TP and TG produce very good
rank orders, and thus very high NDCG scores across the
different k’s. They are better than the GD, ED and Base-
line methods. For small k values, GD and ED are able
to rank better than Baseline hence giving the former two
methods an edge over Baseline.
In summary, the experimental results show that our method
is effective as indicated by the inter-evaluator agreement in
labeling spammers and non-spammers, as well as by the
higher NDCG values for the proposed strategies as compared
to the baseline. In particular, the TP and TG strategies are
very strong indicators of spam. In contrast, the baseline ap-
proach of using unhelpfulness votes is not a good indicator
of spam.
7. SUPERVISED SPAMMER DETECTION
AND ANALYSIS OF SPAMMED OBJECTS
7.1 Regression Model for Spammers
With the labeled spammers, we now train a linear regres-
sion model to predict the number of spam votes of a given
reviewer’s spamming behaviors, i.e., GD, ED, TP, TG
scores. To ensure that the trained regression model make
TG
TP
Figure 4: NDCG Results
as little prediction errors as possible at the highly ranked
reviewers, we consider the number of spam votes in the ob-
jective function for optimizing the regression model.
The regression model trained on the 50 labeled reviewers
is shown below:
Number of spam votes(ui) = w0 + w1 · cd(ui) +
w2 · ce(ui) + w3 · cp(ui) + w4 · cg(ui)
The regression model learnt by minimizing mean square er-
ror has these wi values: w0 = 0.37, w1 = −0.42, w2 = 1.23,
w3 = 2.86, w4 = 4.2. It is interesting to note that the learnt
weights are quite consistent with those used in Section 6.1.
The only surprise is that general deviation GD is now given
a negative weight. This suggests that having larger gen-
eral deviation does not make a reviewer looks more like a
spammer, although early deviation does.
We then apply the regression model on all 11,038 review-
ers assigning each of them a new spam score normalized by
the maximum score value and denote it by s(ui)’s. The dis-
tribution of normalized spam scores is shown in Figure 5.
Most reviewers have relatively small spam scores. There are
513 (4.65%) reviewers having spam scores greater than or
equal to the upper-whisker of the distribution (0.23).
7.2 Analysis of Spammed Products and Prod-
uct Groups
To show how the products and product groups are affected
by spammers, we define a spam Index for a product oj and
a product group gl as:
s(oj) = Avgui∈Us(oj)s(ui) (24)
s(gl) = Avgui∈Us(gl)s(ui) (25)
where Us(oj) denotes the set of reviewers of oj each hav-
ing spam scores computed by our trained regression model.
Us(gl) denotes the set of reviewers of objects of product
group gl.
For comparison, two baseline indices are also defined for
products and product groups. Instead of using the reviewer’s
spam score s(ui) like Equations 24 and 25:
• Unhelpfulness score: Average of unhelpfulness scores
of reviewers of the product or product groups.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Reviewers’ New Spam
Scores after Normalization
• Random Index: Average of random score from 0 to 1
assigned to reviewers of the product or product groups.
One way to study the impact of spammers is to compare
the average ratings of a product or a product group when
spammers are included versus when they are excluded. Fig-
ure 6 shows how the average rating of a product changes af-
ter removing the top 4.65% users with highest spam scores.
This is the fraction of users with spam scores greater than or
equal to the upper-whisker of the distribution in Figure 5).
Products are ranked from largest to smallest s(oj) values.
The figure shows that the rating changes are more signifi-
cant for the top 10 and 20 percentiles of products for the
removed spammers or reviewers with highest unhelpful ra-
tio indexes. The removed reviewers due to random index, on
the other hand, leave similar rating changes on the products
across the different percentile products. Figures 7 shows a
similar figure for product brands, with similar observations.
To see why the changes in ratings are more significant
at higher percentiles, we plot the average proportion of re-
viewers removed from the products (Figure 6b) and product
brands (Figure 7b) as a result of removing the top spam-
mers. Both figures show that most of the reviewers re-
moved by spam scores and unhelpful ratio index belong to
the highly ranked products and brands. This explains more
rating changes for these products and brands.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a behavioral approach to detect re-
view spammers who try to manipulate review ratings on
some target products or product groups. We derive an ag-
gregated behavior scoring methods to rank reviewers accord-
ing to the degree they demonstrate spamming behaviors. To
evaluate our proposed methods, we conduct user evaluation
on an Amazon dataset containing reviews of manufactured
products. We found that our proposed methods generally
outperform the baseline method based on helpfulness votes.
We further learn a regression model from the user-labeled
ground truth spammers, and apply the learnt model to score
reviewers. It is shown that by removing reviewers with very
high spam scores, the highly spammed products and prod-
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Figure 6: Products after removing high spam score
reviewers
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Figure 7: Brands after removing high spam score
reviewers
uct groups according to our approach will experience more
significant changes in aggregate rating and reviewer count
compared with removing randomly scored or unhelpful re-
viewers. As part of our future work, we can incorporate
review spammer detection into review detection and vice
versa. Exploring ways to learn behavior patterns related
to spamming so as to improve the accuracy of the current
regression model is also an interesting research direction.
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